Sitting here on the west coast and viewing the consternation that folks on the east coast are having re the improperly marked trawl warps on the Albatross IV and the negative impacts that that mistake appears to have had on groundfish resource estimates in New England, compels  me to pass along an observation from my own experience with resource surveys in New England and along the west coast with NMFS and its predecessor organization, BCF.

 My first experience aboard a BCF/NMFS resource survey vessel took place In 1957 when I had the opportunity to spend a summer at the Woods Hole Lab working in the Redfish Program under George Kelly.  As part of my summer's work, I participated in some survey/sampling work aboard the BCF side-trawler, Albatross III, on Georges Bank.  We successfully trawled at a number of stations on Georges using their standard roller-rigged trawl gear. I don't recall any problems with mismarked trawl cables.

 In 1961 I became employed full-time by BCF (now NMFS) on the west coast in BCF's Seattle Exploratory Fishing and Gear Research Base, participating in and planning for resource surveys and gear research cruses along the entire west-coast from the Arctic to Baja California aboard the John N. Cobb, Miller Freemen, Oregon and numerous chartered fishing vessels.  These research surveys also were carried out successfully and  have formed the basis for our understanding of the west coast groundfish stocks and the establishment of our management measures in place today.

In my mind one of the main reasons that these early resource surveys aboard the BCF/NMFS vessels were successful in providing an accurate data base on which to build and manage our successful groundfish fisheries in the North Pacific, is that the survey vessels were run by long time, professional fishermen who were fully experienced in fishing gear and its successful operation and the operation of the survey vessel under their command.

There was never any question as to the replicative performance of our standard trawl hauls from one station to the next nor from one year to the next.  If for some reason warp lengths might have been incorrect or the gear

was not rigged properly, these long time, professional fishermen in charge of the vessel's operation would know almost immediately that there was a problem simply by the way the gear towed or later by the way the gear looked when it came up on deck.  If there was a problem, changes could be made on the spot and the standard survey could continue as designed.

 In the mid 70s, though, this command structure aboard the NMFS fishery survey vessels was modified significantly.  At that time NOAA systematically replaced the long time captains and mates running the NMFS fishery survey vessels with NOAA Corps Officers.  Gone was the experienced, professional fisherman in the wheelhouse.  Lost was that invaluable understanding of fishing gear and the extensive experience at the helm of a fishing trawler. The NOAA Corp Officers themselves were certainly qualified, educated captains in their own right, but they were not fishermen.  They could not be expected to have that most important "feel" for the nuances of properly fishing a bottom trawl so that it fished similarly from one station to the next from the inner shelf to the outer slope on various bottom types and in changing weather and current conditions.

 Another change that took place during the 70s was the onshore management of the NMFS survey vessels themselves.  Management responsibility was taken away from the labs with which they worked and placed in the NOAA vessel management centers that managed the other vessels in the NOAA fleet (for example in the northwest the NOAA fleet is managed by the Pacific Marine Center; I understand OMAO manages the fleet in New England ).  In the past the fishery survey vessels were most often managed directly by the BCF/NMFS labs or regional offices directly responsible for the fishery surveys.  Such is not the case today.  In my mind this centralization of vessel management today within the NOAA vessel management centers increases the likelihood that mistakes can occur such as the recent mismarking of the trawl cables on the Albatross IV.

 In summary in order to prevent  future mistakes in the collection of fishery survey data, such as occurred with the cable mismarking debacle on the Albatross IV, I think the time has come to seriously examine the command structure of the NOAA fishery survey vessels and Nona's centralized approach to managing the fishery survey portion of their fleet.  The recent interception of the inappropriate remarks made by someone in the command structure of the Albatross as regards the necessity to extend their latest cruise to collect more data to resolve the mismeasured cable snafu reinforces my point.  I think it is time to return the command of our fishery survey vessels to fulltime, professional fisherman skippers (with papers, of course).  It is difficult enough to conduct accurate fishery surveys with a high level of precision.  Let's not compromise this most important aspect of the resource management function by placing NOAA Corp Officers at the helms of our fishery survey vessels.  At the same time the on shore management of the fishery survey rigs should be reviewed to determine if a return of management to those responsible for the fishery surveys is a more risk-adverse management structure.

 Regards,

Wally Pereyra